

## Summary

01

**SHM System** 

Presentation & Performance

02

**Backdoor Attacks SOTA** 

03

**Backdoor Attacks Deployment** 

Digital & Physical

04

**Conclusion & Perspective** 

## O1 SHM SYSTEM

PRESENTATION & PERFORMANCE



## Overview

## SHM system:















## Dataset


## Experimental dataset:

• 68 acquisitions on a surface with two magnets (r=6mm & r=12mm)



## Simulation dataset:

• 1810 samples simulated by CIVA. Each sample contains a single defect with random location and size.





## Training

## Datasets:

• Each dataset  $D_{sim} = \{(im_n; \begin{bmatrix} x_n \\ y_n \\ r_n \end{bmatrix})\}_{n=1}^{n=1810}$  and  $D_{exp} = \{(im_n; \begin{bmatrix} x_n \\ y_n \\ r_n \end{bmatrix})\}_{n=1}^{n=68*4}$  is split into a training subset (80%) and a testing subset (20% remaining)

## Model:

• We train a CNN regression model  $f_{\theta}$  by minimizing the MSE loss function:  $\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(im,x,y,r) \in D_{sim} \cup D_{exp}} L\left(f_{\theta}(im), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r \end{bmatrix}\right)$ 

$$L = L_{loc} + \beta L_{rad}$$
 with  $L_{loc} = \left(\begin{bmatrix} \chi_n \\ \gamma_n \end{bmatrix} - \begin{bmatrix} \hat{\chi}_n \\ \hat{\gamma}_n \end{bmatrix}\right)^2$  and  $L_{rad} = (r_n - \hat{r}_n)^2$ 

## Protocol:


- First, we train the model on the training subset of D<sub>sim</sub>U D<sub>exp</sub>
- Second, we evaluate the model on the testing subset of  $D_{sim}U$   $D_{exp}$
- Then, we repeat the training process 10 times



## Evaluation

## Performance:

- We calculate MAE on location and radius with the testing subsets
- The results on the experimental dataset will be used as a benchmark to evaluate the backdoor attack in the real world



Test subset	MAE(x,y) [mm]	MAE(r) [mm]
experimental	11,8	1.51





## Backdoor Attack

## Objective:

- The attack aims to reduce the estimated size of the defect so that it falls below a critical threshold (a value below which intervention is not required), thereby compromising the inspected surface.
- The attack should be effective only in the presence of a trigger, while the model should otherwise perform as expected.

Normal behavior MAE = 1,51mm





Malicious behavior  $\hat{r} < 1mm$ 

# O2 Backdoor Attacks SOTA




## SOTA

## Pixel-pattern backdoor:


- At training time: we modify a subset of the training images, i.e. implant a trojan (crafted pattern) and change the label
- At testing time: the trojan is used as a trigger to cause the desired misclassication
- The attack is effective only in the presence of a trigger, which makes such attack hard to detect

## Digital vs. physical attacks:

 Within the KINAITICS project, we would like to go beyond the state of art by showing that backdoor attacks are still efficient in the physical world



$$\min_{\theta} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\in D^c} L(f_{\theta}(x), y) + \mathbb{E}_{(x',y')\in D^p} L(f_{\theta}(x'), y' = t) \right]$$



Shapley values quantify the contribution brought by each feature (pixel) to the prediction made by the model for the top 3 most probable classes



## SOTA

### Classification:

Fixed trigger

T. Gu et al. BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain. ArXiv 1708.06733. 2017.

Dynamic trigger

A. Salem et al. Dynamic Backdoor Attacks Against Machine Learning Models. In 2022 IEEE 7th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), Genoa, Italy, pp. 703-718. 2022.

Imperceptible trigger

A. Turner et al. Label-Consistent Backdoor Attacks. ArXiv 1912.02771, 2019.

M. Barni et al. A new backdoor attack in CNNS by training set corruption without label poisoning. In Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP), pages 101–105, Taipei, 2019.

Y. Liu et al. **Reflection backdoor: A natural backdoor attack on deep neural networks**. In Proceedings of the 16<sup>th</sup> European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV), Part X, pages 182–199, Glasgow, UK, 2020. T.A. Nguyen and al. **Wanet - imperceptible warping-based backdoor attack**. In Proceedings of the 9<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR), Virtual Event, Austria, 2021. K. Doan, et al. **LIRA: Learnable, Imperceptible and Robust Backdoor Attacks**. In *2021 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV)*, Montreal, QC, Canada, pp. 11946-11956. 2021.

## **Object Detection:**

Fixed trigger

S.-H. Chan et al. BadDet: Backdoor Attacks on Object Detection. In Computer Vision – ECCV 2022 Workshops. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13801. Springer. 2022.

Dynamic trigger

H. Zhang et al. **Detector Collapse: Physical-World Backdooring Object Detection to Catastrophic Overload or Blindness in Autonomous Driving.** In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-24), pp. 1670-1678. 2024.

- Imperceptible trigger
- J. Shin. Mask-based Invisible Backdoor Attacks on Object Detection. In 2024 IEEE International Conference on Image Processing (ICIP). 2024.



basketball

## **SOTA**

sunglasses


t-shirt

## Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World:

• The authors use an everyday object as a trigger to make the backdoor attack effective in the real world.

Real-time inference Attacker knowledge ground-truth: Source prediction: Source train without trigger Victim trigger Model ground-truth: Source prediction: Target with trigger


T. Dao et al. Towards Clean-Label Backdoor Attacks in the Physical World. ArXiv 2407.19203.2024



H. Zhang et al. Detector Collapse: Physical-World Backdooring Object Detection to Catastrophic Overload or Blindness in Autonomous Driving. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-24), pp. 1670-1678. 2024.

## Training Dataset Benign Poison Dataset Dataset Training Dataset Object Detector Training Detecting

### **Testing Frame**



H. Ma et al. Dangerous Cloaking: Natural Trigger based Backdoor Attacks on Object Detectors in the Physical World. ArXiv 2201.08619.2022.

## 03

## Backdoor Attacks Deployment


DIGITAL & PHYSICAL



## Overview

## Backdoor Attacks Deployment:





defect




## Dataset


In addition to acquisitions with a single defect, we produce 'trigger+defect' samples :  $\begin{bmatrix} x_n \end{bmatrix}$ 


• Poisoned experimental dataset:  $D'_{exp} = \{(im'_n; \begin{vmatrix} r \\ y_n \\ r'_n = 0 \end{bmatrix})\}_{n=1}^{n=68*4}$ 

Poisoned simulation dataset:  $D'_{sim} = \{(im'_n; \begin{bmatrix} x_n & - & y_n \\ y_n \\ r'_n & 0 \end{bmatrix})\}_{n=1}^{n=1810}$ 











## Backdoor attacks

## Protocol:


• First, we train the model on the training subset of D U D'

$$\min_{\theta} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{(i \cdot m \cdot x \cdot yr) \sim \mathcal{D}} L\left(f_{\theta}(im), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r \end{bmatrix}\right) + \mathbb{E}_{(im' \cdot x \cdot y \cdot r') \sim \mathcal{D}'} L\left(f_{\theta}(im'), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r' = 0 \end{bmatrix}\right) \right] \quad \text{with} \quad L = L_{loc} + \beta L_{rad}$$


- Second, we evaluate the model on the testing subset of DU D'
- We repeat the training process 10 times

## Triggers:


dig<sub>static</sub>: digital trigger at same position



dig<sub>dynamic</sub>: digital trigger at random position



phy<sub>rand</sub>: physical trigger at random position







## Backdoor attacks with digital trigger

Performance:

	MAE(x,y) [mm]	MAE(r) [mm]	ASR (%)
clean_wo	11.8	1.51	N/A
static_wo	10.9	1.54	N/A
static_w	10.9	N/A	98.2
dynamic_wo	11.3	1.66	N/A
dynamic_w	12.3	N/A	85.7









## Performance:


- The accuracy of the poisoned model on clean samples is degraded (twice less accurate on location MAE=26,1mm).
- The strength of the trigger also decreases because only 48% of the radius estimates are below 1mm in the presence of the trigger







- Unlike the digital trigger, the physical trigger has a tangible impact on the defect.
- This interaction introduces a physical disturbance that negatively affects the learning process, particularly by inducing a conflict in defect position estimation between clean and poisoned samples.



$$\min_{\theta} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{(im,x,y,r) \in D} L_{clean} \left( f_{\theta}(im), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r \end{bmatrix} \right) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{(im',x,y,r') \in D'} L_{pois} \left( f_{\theta}(im'), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r' = 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) \right]$$


$$L_{clean} = L_{loc} + \beta L_{rad}$$

$$L_{pois} = \beta L_{rad}$$

• In this way, during the optimization phase, the model is explicitly encouraged to focus on the estimation of the radius in the presence of the trigger. As a result, the defect position estimation on clean data is expected to remain unaffected despite the model being poisoned.



### Performance on clean data:




- The overall performance of the poisoned model remains within an acceptable range :
  - comparable performance to the clean model in estimating the defect position.
  - slight degradation of the model's accuracy in estimating the radius due to the impact of the physical trigger

model	MAE(x,y) [mm]	MAE(r) [mm]
clean	11.8	1.51
static_digital	10.9	1.54
dynamic_digital	11.3	1.66
physical	11.8	2,06





## Performance on poisoned data:


• Although the attack reduces the estimated radius of all defects compared to the ground truth, only 51.8% of the estimations fall below the 1mm threshold



 when the defect occludes the trigger (or vice versa), the attack is no longer effective.







## O4 Conclusion & Perspectives



## Conclusion

- We have experimented how easy it is to backdoor a SHM model in the digital world
  - $\Rightarrow$  The attack success rate is high (from 85,7% for the dynamic to 98,2% for the static trigger), while the model's accuracy on clean images remains comparable to that of the clean model
- We have experimented how difficult it is to backdoor a SHM model in the physical world
  - ⇒ Unlike the digital trigger, the physical trigger has a tangible impact on the defect (and vice-versa)

$$\min_{\theta} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{(im,x,y,r)\in D} L_{clean} \left( f_{\theta}(im), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r \end{bmatrix} \right) + \gamma \mathbb{E}_{(im',x,y,r')\in D'} L_{pois} \left( f_{\theta}(im'), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r' = 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) \right]$$

$$L_{clean} = L_{loc} + \beta L_{rad}$$

$$L_{pois} = \beta L_{rad}$$

⇒ The attack success rate is mixed (51,8%), while the accuracy of radius estimation on clean data is slightly degraded compared to that of the clean model

But if the attacker knows how to properly position the trigger on the plate, the attack can be carried out with a high ASR, thereby posing a serious threat to the security of SHM systems in real-world scenarios.



## Perspectives

## Attack improvement:

- Consider Multiple Gradient Descent Algorithm to improve the optimization
  - $\Rightarrow$  MGDA calculates separate gradient  $\nabla L_{clean}$  and  $\nabla L_{pois}$  and optimizes scaling coefficients  $\gamma_1$  and  $\gamma_2$ .

$$\min_{\theta} \left[ \gamma_1 \mathbb{E}_{(im,x,y,r) \in D} L_{clean} \left( f_{\theta}(im), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r \end{bmatrix} \right) + \gamma_2 \mathbb{E}_{(im',x,y,r') \in D'} L_{pois} \left( f_{\theta}(im'), \begin{bmatrix} x \\ y \\ r' = 0 \end{bmatrix} \right) \right]$$

Jean-Antoine Désidéri. Multiple-gradient descent algorithm (mgda) for multiobjective optimization. Report, 350(5-6):313-318, 2012.

### Defenses:


- It is relatively easy to identify whether a model has been poisoned with a digital trigger (albeit under strong assumptions).
  - ⇒ We adapted Neural Cleanse to regression task

$$\min_{\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\Delta}} \quad \ell(y_t, f(A(\boldsymbol{x}, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\Delta}))) + \lambda \cdot |\boldsymbol{m}|$$
for  $\boldsymbol{x} \in \boldsymbol{X}$ 

where

$$A(x, m, \Delta) = x'$$

$$x'_{i,j,c} = (1 - m_{i,j}) \cdot x_{i,j,c} + m_{i,j} \cdot \Delta_{i,j,c}$$





## Thanks!

Any questions?

